Megan Young v. Bruce Smith, Jr. by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-25-2018 
Megan Young v. Bruce Smith, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Megan Young v. Bruce Smith, Jr." (2018). 2018 Decisions. 763. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/763 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 17-3190, 17-3201 
_   _             ___  
 
MEGAN YOUNG 
 
 v. 
 
 BRUCE H. SMITH, JR. 
 
 
MEGAN YOUNG; 
*CYNTHIA L. POLLICK, ESQ., 
                                         Appellants 
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), Fed. R. App. P.)  
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-07-cv-00854) 
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on May 21, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ ansd COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 25, 2018) 
______________ 
 
Cynthia L. Pollick 
363 Laurel Street 
Pittston, PA 18640 
 Counsel for Appellant  
 
2 
 
John E. Freund, III 
Keely Jac Collins 
King Spry Herman Freund & Faul, LLC  
One West Broad Street, Suite 700 
Bethlehem, PA 18018 
 Counsel for Appellee 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Cynthia Pollick appeals the District Court’s 
order denying her fee petition, imposing sanctions in the 
aggregate amount of $25,000, and referring Pollick to the 
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for 
unethical billing practices.  Pollick submitted her petition for 
fees and costs that she claimed arose from her representation 
of plaintiffs in a civil rights suit that resulted in two trials and 
a settlement agreement.  The first trial resulted in a favorable 
verdict for Pollick’s clients but was vacated due to Pollick’s 
own misconduct; the second trial ended with a complete 
defense verdict for one of the defendants.  A third trial, against 
the remaining defendant, was avoided because Pollick’s clients 
accepted a Rule 68 settlement offer.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm.     
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
Pollick represented a group of students who brought 
various civil rights claims against a school district and a 
teacher.   During the first trial on those claims, Pollick made 
numerous statements that the Court subsequently found were 
aimed at inflaming the jury.  The jury returned a verdict for 
Pollick’s clients.  However, that verdict was a pyrrhic victory 
because the trial court entered an order vacating the judgment 
and awarding a new trial based upon Pollick’s misconduct.1  
Specifically, the Court found that Pollick had “repeat[ed] 
outrageous conduct” enough times that the jury would believe 
                                              
1 Young v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-00854, 
2012 WL 1827194, at *27-29 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2012).   
3 
 
her allegations as fact.2  In affirming that order, we 
subsequently explained that the District Court had “cataloged 
an extensive record of misconduct by [Ms. Pollick] throughout 
the [trial]” and it was therefore “‘reasonably probable’ that the 
misconduct prejudicially influenced the verdict.”3 
 
 The second trial was only against the school district.  
That trial resulted in a complete defense verdict.  Before a third 
trial – which would have involved only the teacher – could 
begin, the teacher tendered a Rule 68 offer of judgment for 
$25,000, which Pollick’s clients accepted.  That settlement 
allowed for “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as to the 
claims against [the teacher] only, up until the date of [the] 
offer.”4  Despite the express limitations of the settlement, 
Pollick submitted a fee petition requesting fees and costs 
purportedly incurred while representing her clients against 
both the school district and the teacher.  The petition also 
included fees and costs for work on the second trial in which 
Pollick’s clients were not the prevailing party and therefore not 
entitled to recover fees or costs, absent circumstances not 
found here.  As noted, the total amount of the recovery from 
the teacher via the settlement was $25,000.  Yet, Pollick 
submitted a fee petition in the amount of $733,002.23.   
 
 Not surprisingly, the District Court scheduled a hearing 
on the petition and ordered Pollick to show cause why she 
should not be sanctioned for seeking “fees and costs for 
portions of the litigation that were necessitated by her own 
vexatious conduct, as against defendants that she ultimately did 
not prevail, for certain expenses previously held unrecoverable 
by judges of this Court, and relative to the total settlement of 
$25,000[.]”5 
 
                                              
2 See id. at *29. 
3 Young v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 601 F. App’x 132, 135 
(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 
Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 207 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
4 A304.  Citations to the appellate record appear with the 
letter “A” followed by the page number.   
5See Young v. Smith, 269 F.Supp. 3d 251, 345 (M.D. Pa. 
2017). 
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 At the show cause hearing, Pollick proffered the rather 
remarkable, and utterly ridiculous argument that she could 
submit whatever bill she chose and that it was the job of 
opposing counsel and the Court to ferret out entries that were 
invalid or unreasonable.6  She also declined an invitation from 
the Court to submit an amended fee petition.7  To no one’s 
great surprise (with the possible exception of Ms. Pollick), the 
Court disagreed with her approach to fee petitions, rejected her 
argument, and imposed sanctions.8 
 
 The Court noted that the fee petition was single-spaced, 
in either 6 or 8-point font that consumed forty-four pages and 
included hundreds of inappropriate, unethical entries that 
would likely be illegal if billed to a client.9  Nevertheless, the 
Court initially went above and beyond the call of duty and 
undertook the daunting task of a line-by-line review.  Not 
surprisingly, the Court eventually capitulated after concluding 
that such a review was a total waste of time, as well as 
unwarranted and inappropriate given Pollick’s persistent 
misconduct.10,11     
                                              
6 Id. at 263. 
7 Id. at 262. 
8 As may have been predicted from Ms. Pollick’s pattern of 
conduct, the hearing did not go well for her.  The District 
Court described the experience as follows: “I was transported 
to a universe devoid of legal principles and fundamental 
notions of relevance. Ms. Pollick’s strange and obstreperous 
conduct at the hearing also flaunted any semblance of 
propriety and decorum in federal court[.]” Id. 
9 Id. at 259.  (This is an example of 8-point font, and this is an example of 6 point font). 
10 Id. at 264, 267. 
11 The Court explained, “[the] shortcoming here is not one 
that can be ameliorated by careful, line-by-line revisions.  I 
attempted to give Ms. Pollick the benefit of the doubt and 
pursue such an approach at first.  However, I soon discovered 
that this method was fool’s errand . . . nearly every one of her 
thousands of entries needs to be eliminated or refined.”  Id. at 
263.  The Court also noted that defense counsel tried to revise 
the petition as well, but “gave up after billing approximately 
one hundred hours on the task and simply began crossing out 
entire pages … My experience was the same.” Id.  To 
illustrate the point, the Court even included defense counsel’s 
5 
 
A brief sampling of the content of the fee petition 
illustrates why the Court was so exasperated.  Pollick requested 
attorney’s fees for the first trial even though the verdict was 
vacated because of her own misconduct.  She requested 
attorney’s fees for the second trial even though it resulted in a 
complete defense verdict and her clients were therefore not the 
prevailing party.  A further example of the egregiousness of her 
conduct is the fact that, even though the settlement limited 
recovery to fees and costs arising only from her claims against 
the teacher, Pollick requested fees and costs for the second 
trial, which only involved the school district.12   
 
As if all of that were not sufficiently offensive and 
unprofessional conduct to support sanctions, the District Court 
also found that hundreds of entries in the fee petition were not 
merely unreasonable or inaccurate but were actually 
fraudulent.  The District Court concluded that, “even if it took 
[Pollick] one minute to read an email and one minute to 
respond back (two minutes total), she has billed all of those 
communications (hundreds of times over) in two separate six-
minute increments.  Such practice essentially pads her time in 
ten-minute increments (12 minutes versus two minutes).”13  
The Court also noted that, less than five months prior to the 
instant petition, Pollick had been warned against filing such fee 
petitions by two other district court judges.14 
 
 Following the hearing, the Court denied Pollick’s fee 
petition in its entirety, issued concurrent $25,000 sanctions 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, and referred her inappropriate billing practices to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Board.15  Pollick 
appeals. 
                                              
failed attempt to revise the petition to its opinion as Appendix 
B.  Id. 
12 Id. at 260. 
13 Id.  
14 See Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 159 F.Supp. 3d 514, 
525-42 (M.D. Pa. 2016); Carroll v. Clifford Twp., No. 3:12-
CV-0553, 2014 WL 2860994, at *3-5 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 
2014), aff’d, 625 F. App’x. 43, 46 (3d Cir. 2015). 
15 The District Court described the show cause hearing on the 
reasonableness of Pollick’s fee petition as “perhaps the 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
 Pollick alleges eighteen separate errors by the District 
Court.  Collectively, these claims challenge the denial of her 
fee petition as a whole, the amount and imposition of her 
sanction, and the referral to the Disciplinary Board.  The 
District Court issued a scathing 136-page opinion detailing 
Pollick’s misconduct, the innumerable problems with the fee 
petition, the many warnings Pollick has received in other cases 
for the same misconduct, our prior non-precedential opinions 
affirming those decisions, and the need for a severe sanction 
here.  After reviewing the District Court’s thorough 
explanation for the challenged order, the other judicial 
decisions citing similar misconduct by Pollick, and our 
decisions affirming those rulings, it is clear that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pollick’s fee 
petition in its entirety, imposing the $25,000 sanctions, and 
referring her to the Disciplinary Board.16 
 
A. Whether the Court properly denied the entire fee 
petition 
 
 The District Court found that the fee petition contained 
so many inappropriate billing entries and that its deficiencies 
were so widespread that a line-by-line reduction would be 
“infeasible, inaccurate, and would further waste the public’s 
resources.”17  The Court also found that Pollick’s billing 
misconduct, the inconsiderate font size, her refusal to amend 
                                              
strangest show cause hearing in my tenure with this [c]ourt.” 
Young, 269 F.Supp. 3d at 262.   
16 We have plenary review over whether the District Court 
applied the correct legal standard to its award of attorney’s 
fees.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 
1990).  But we review the reasonableness of the District 
Court’s refusal to award attorney’s fees and costs for abuse of 
discretion.  Id.  A district court abuses its discretion when its 
“decision ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.’”  P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 
989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
17 See Young, 269 F.Supp. 3d at 277. 
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her fee petition to correct inappropriate billing, and her 
exorbitant billing rate all warranted denial of the fee petition in 
toto.18 
 
 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), in any civil rights action, a 
district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” 
reasonable attorney’s fees.19  However, a court also has the 
discretion to deny attorney’s fees to a prevailing party based 
upon counsel’s misconduct.20  Moreover, a court may sua 
sponte reduce requested fees with respect to matters within the 
judge’s personal knowledge.21   
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires attorneys to 
be careful and scrupulously honest in their filings and 
representations to the court.  Therefore, it is absolutely 
imperative that attorneys submit honest and accurate fee 
petitions.22  Courts have discretion to completely strike fee 
petitions submitted in violation of Rule 11.23     
 
 Here, the litany of misconduct that the District Court 
cataloged justified striking her entire fee petition under Rule 
11.  It is impossible to read the District Court’s Memorandum 
                                              
18 See id. at 259-65. 
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (emphasis added). 
20 See Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 841-42 (3d 
Cir. 1984); see also Fair Hous. Council of Greater Wash. v. 
Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 96 (4th Cir. 1993) (permitting denial of 
fees where request “so excessive it shocks the conscience of 
the court.”); Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 
1991); Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
21 McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 459 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“[A]warding of an attorney’s fee is a judicial action 
and, regardless of the parties’ indifference to it, a court need 
not lend its imprimatur to an inappropriate order merely 
because there was no objection to its entry [by the opposing 
party]”); Bell v. United Princeton Prop., Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 
718-19 (3d Cir. 1989). 
22 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Hall, 
747 F.2d at 842. 
23 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) and accompanying advisory 
notes. 
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Opinion and not conclude that the Court believed that Pollick’s 
billing entries and practices fall somewhere between gross 
negligence and outright fraud.  The Court concluded that hours 
were padded and rates were inflated.  The Court also concluded 
that Pollick billed for work she could not be compensated for 
under the Settlement Agreement as well as time spent on the 
second trial in which her clients were not even the prevailing 
party.   
 
 We have clearly stated (although it should not be 
necessary to emphasize the proposition) that “members of the 
bar are quasi-officers of the court and they are expected to be 
careful and scrupulously honest in their representations to the 
court.”24  The District Court’s meticulous opinion paints a 
picture of an attorney whose attitude toward billing and the 
court is cavalier in the extreme and whose conduct and 
demeanor bear no relationship whatsoever to an attorney’s 
obligations to the court.  Pollick responded to the District 
Court’s rejection of her fee petition by insisting that she had no 
responsibility to be accurate (or even careful) in her billing 
because, in her view, it was up to opposing counsel and the 
Court to determine its accuracy.  She tasked them with doing 
her job.  To make all of this worse, when Pollick was given the 
opportunity to amend the petition – at a sanctions hearing – she 
refused.  We know of no decision or rule of procedure that 
would suggest that counsel can be as reckless and irresponsible 
as Pollick insists she can be in her court filings.   
 
 This conduct is even more incomprehensible when we 
consider, as noted above, that, within five months of 
submitting this fee petition, Pollick had been warned about her 
billing practices by no less than two other judges in the same 
district court.  One judge greatly reduced her fees;25 the other 
completely denied her fee petition;26 we affirmed both 
decisions.27  It is obvious from our review of this record that 
                                              
24 Hall, 747 F.2d at 841-42.  
25 See Souryavong, 159 F.Supp. 3d at 525-42. 
26 See Carroll, 2014 WL 2860994, at *3-5.  
27 See Sourvayong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 872 F.3d 122, 127-
29 (3d Cir. 2017); Carroll v. Clifford Twp., 625 F. App’x 43 
(3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential). 
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the District Court acted well within its discretion in denying 
the entire petition here.   
 
We have not previously, in a precedential opinion, had 
occasion to address whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) permits 
courts to “deny a request for [attorney’s] fees in its entirety 
when the request is so outrageously excessive [that] it shocks 
the conscience of the court.”28  In Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 
we did suggest that a district court has discretion to reject a fee 
petition submitted under § 1988 where the hours claimed were 
not only “grossly excessive but ‘simply absurd.’”29  However, 
we did not formally adopt that rule there because the fee 
petition at issue was not sufficiently egregious to warrant a 
complete denial of attorney’s fees.  Pollick’s is. 
 
In our recent decision in Clemens v. New York Central 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company, we swept more broadly, 
holding, in the context of Pennsylvania’s Bad Faith Statute30, 
that “where a fee-shifting statute provides a court discretion to 
award attorney’s fees, such discretion includes the ability to 
deny a fee request altogether when, under the circumstances, 
the amount requested is ‘outrageously excessive.’”31 
 
We have no trouble agreeing with the District Court’s 
conclusion that Pollick’s fee petition clears the high threshold 
required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for a court to reject a petition in 
its entirety.  The record here supports the Court’s conclusion 
that Pollick’s fee petition is not only grossly excessive and 
absurd, but also fraudulent.  As noted above, the total amount 
of the recovery for Pollick’s clients was $25,000.  Yet, she 
                                              
28 See M.G. v. East. Reg. High Sch. Dist., 386 F. App’x 186, 
188 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential) (collecting cases); see 
also Clemens v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 17-
3150, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2018) (holding, in the 
context of a Pennsylvania fee-shifting statute, that “where a 
fee-shifting statute provides a court discretion to award 
attorney’s fees, such discretion includes the ability to deny a 
fee request altogether when, under the circumstances, the 
amount requested is ‘outrageously excessive.’” 
29 See Hall, 747 F.2d at 841-42. 
30 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371 
31 Clemens, No. 17-3150, slip op. at 3. 
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submitted a fee petition in the amount of $733,002.23.  As we 
also noted above, Pollick submitted this petition even though 
two different district court judges had been strongly criticized 
her submitting for submitting this kind of absurd fee petition.  
Those judges warned her against such excessiveness just 
months before she filed the instant petition.32  
 
  Pollick’s response to the District Court’s citation to 
those prior cases as support for the sanction it imposed here is 
either an amazing blend of irreverence and insolence, or an 
astonishing misunderstanding of what “non-precedential” 
means.  She actually suggests that those decisions should have 
had no bearing on the Court’s disposition of her fee petition 
here because we affirmed the orders imposing sanctions there 
in non-precedential decisions.33  Since we did not issue 
precedential opinions in those cases, Pollick claims that she 
was free to ignore those District Judges’ admonitions here.  She 
actually purports to believe that the District Court should have 
ignored the fact that she had been warned and was on notice 
about this type of conduct.34  According to Pollick, those 
district court opinions are not binding upon her even though 
those opinions were specifically directed at her and concerned 
this exact behavior.35  It is nothing short of breathtaking that an 
attorney would seriously claim that the fact that a holding in a 
non-precedential decision of this Court is not binding on future 
panels of the Court licenses her to ignore the judges’ 
reprimands in those cases.  We need not respond to that 
assertion any further.  
 
We now formally join our sister circuit courts of appeals 
and hold that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a court may deny a 
request for attorney’s fees in toto where the request is so 
outrageously excessive that it shocks the conscience of the 
court.36  We also formally apply our holding in Clemens to fee 
                                              
32 See, e.g., Souryavong, 159 F.Supp. 3d at 525-42; Carroll, 
2014 WL 2860994, at *3-5. 
33 See Appellant’s Br. at 34-35. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See Landow, 999 F.2d at 96; Lewis, 944 F.2d at 958; 
Brown, 612 F.2d at 1059. 
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petitions filed pursuant to § 1988(b).37 Accordingly, we affirm 
the District Court’s denial of Pollick’s fee petition under § 
1988(b).   
 
That does not, however, end our inquiry as we must also 
determine if the imposition of monetary sanctions was 
warranted and, if so, whether the imposed sanctions were 
excessive.  We hold that, under the circumstances here, the 
sanctions were not an abuse of discretion. 
 
B. Whether a $25,000 sanction was excessive 
 
 The District Court sanctioned numerous violations of 
Rule 11, including those mentioned above, that need not be 
reiterated here.38  We will stress, however, that Pollick’s Rule 
11 coup de grace was self-inflicted.  She insisted that it was 
not her responsibility to ensure the accuracy of the fee petition 
– a document she filed with the District Court.  That statement 
is diametrically opposed to the plain language of Rule 11 and 
fundamental notions of being a quasi-officer of the court.39  
The District Court surely did not abuse its discretion by finding 
that Pollick’s conduct warranted sanctions and Pollick’s 
arguments to the contrary are nothing short of frivolous.  
Therefore, we are left to determine whether the sanctions 
amounted to an abuse of discretion.   
 
Where a district court decides to award a monetary 
sanction, the total amount of such a sanction should be guided 
by equitable considerations.40  Among those considerations is 
                                              
37 See Clemens, No. 17-3150, slip op. at 3. 
38 The Court also sanctioned Ms. Pollick under 28 U.S.C. § 
1927 for the same “vexatious conduct.”  Young, 269 F.Supp. 
3d at 335-40.  Since the sanctions were made concurrent and 
we affirm the sanction under Rule 11, we need not analyze 
the sanction under § 1927.  See Hassen v. Virgin Islands, 861 
F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “we may affirm on 
any grounds supported by the record.”). 
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
40 See Zuk v. Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of 
Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Doering v. 
Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195 
(3d Cir. 1988)).  
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the sanctioned party’s ability to pay.41  We have instructed 
courts to refrain from imposing monetary sanctions so great 
that they are punitive or that have the potential of putting the 
sanctioned party out of business.42 
 
Pollick argues that she “is a sole practitioner and to 
require her to pay $25,000 to the [c]ourt is basically driving 
[her] out of the business of law.”43  She relies on our decision 
in Doering v. Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders to 
support her argument.44  However, in Doering, the sanctioned 
attorney specifically asked the District Court to reduce the 
award and submitted evidence attesting to his limited financial 
resources.45  Here, Pollick did not request a reduction of the 
sanction, nor did she submit anything to substantiate her 
claimed inability to pay. 
 
Given the absence of any showing that the sanction 
would “run her out of business,” any request for a reduced 
sanction, and Pollick’s refusal to amend her fee petition, we 
cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion by 
imposing a $25,000 sanction. 46  
 
                                              
41 Doering, 857 F.2d at 195.  
42 Id. at 196 (citing Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified 
Federal Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1094, n.12 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
43 Appellant’s Br. at 50. 
44 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988). 
45 Id. at 196. 
46 See Watson v. City of Salem, 934 F.Supp. 666, 668 (D.N.J. 
1996) (finding sanctioned attorney’s decision to rely on her 
assertions in court that, as a solo practitioner, she was unable 
to pay was unavailing and insufficient in the absence of any 
personal financial documentation); see also In re Jackson, 
139 F.3d 901, 901 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Jackson also argues that 
the district court should have considered his inability to pay a 
monetary sanction before imposing his opponents’ costs of 
appeal on him, but he waived this argument by failing to 
present it to the district court.”); Brandt v. Schal Assocs., Inc., 
960 F.2d 640, 652 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that a sanctioned 
attorney cannot complain about the amount of the sanction 
where she waived the use of her ability to pay as a defense). 
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C. Whether Referral to the Disciplinary Committee 
was warranted 
 
 Finally, Pollick complains that the District Court 
referred her to the Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Board as part 
of the sanction.  She claims that such a harsh sanction was 
unwarranted and the overarching goal of deterrence could have 
been achieved with a much less severe sanction.   She ignores 
the fact that the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 11 
specifically envision such a sanction for willful and repeated 
misconduct.47  Moreover, the referral may well be required 
under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 
8.3 provides that, “any lawyer who knows that another lawyer 
has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall 
inform the appropriate professional authority.”48 
 
Moreover, the District Court was concerned that many 
of Pollick’s entries in the fee petition appeared to be fraudulent.  
For that reason alone, referral for disciplinary review was 
appropriate.  The referral was, after all, not a finding.  It was a 
referral for further inquiry.  Obviously, the ultimate resolution 
of that referral rests with the Disciplinary Board, not with the 
District Court or this Court. 
 
 Given the totality of Pollick’s conduct here, as well as 
prior instances of apparent misconduct that the District Court 
quite properly considered,49 we cannot conclude that the 
District Court acted improperly in referring Pollick to the 
Disciplinary Board.  
 
                                              
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 
Amendment (“The Court has available a variety of possible 
sanctions to impose for violations, such as . . . referring the 
matter to disciplinary authorities[.]”). 
48 204 PA. CODE § 81.4, Rule 8.3(a). 
49 See Souryavong, 159 F.Supp. 3d at 525-42; Carroll, 2014 
WL 2860994, at *3-5. 
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 Pollick’s remaining contentions do not merit any 
additional discussion.50 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 In  Hall, we observed: “[b]ecause . . . civil rights laws 
depend greatly upon private enforcement, [Congress] thought 
that fee awards were essential if private citizens were to have 
a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important 
congressional policies contained in the civil rights laws.”51  
Nothing that we have said today, in response to the very unique 
circumstances here, should in anyway be interpreted as 
mitigating the necessity of fee awards, our appreciation of 
those awards, or our appreciation for the many attorneys who 
extend themselves and their services to vindicate the civil 
rights of their clients.  We emphasize, therefore, that although 
we affirm the denial of the fee petition in toto here, it is the 
exceedingly rare case where such a drastic sanction is 
appropriate.   
                                              
50 Pollick also alleged that (1) her clients’ award was not de 
minimus; (2) the Rule 68 offer provided no limitation on 
attorney fees; (3) all of the activities for which she billed were 
intertwined and thus recoverable – including the first and 
second trials; (4) computerized chronological time records are 
not vague or ambiguous; (5) time spent with media, pre-trial 
administrative proceedings, and internal staff are all 
recoverable attorney fees; (6) there was sufficient evidence to 
support the billed rate of $400 per hour given Ms. Pollick’s 
experience; (7) opinions from other District Court judges 
regarding prior fee petitions were not binding in later 
unrelated cases – even in the same District Court; (8) Rule 11 
sanctions should not be entered sua sponte; (9) the District 
Court failed to provide adequate procedural protections 
before imposing sanctions; (10)  the District Court failed to 
give Ms. Pollick proper notice that monetary sanctions were 
being considered; (11) Ms. Pollick was not acting in bad faith 
in filing the fee petition; (12) the District Court imposed a 
higher sanction than permissible under § 1927; and (13) the 
fee petition should be considered by a new judge. 
51 Hall, 747 F.2d at 839. 
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 Nevertheless, on this record, for all the reasons set forth 
above, we have no difficulty affirming the judgment of the 
District Court. 
